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CHEVRON DEFERENCE, THE RULE OF LAW, 
AND PRESIDENTIAL INFLUENCE 
IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
Peter M. Shane* 
INTRODUCTION 
Adrian Vermeule has accurately observed that ―[t]he administrative state 
is the central and unavoidable topic of modern constitutional theorizing.‖1  
So it is also with administrative law theorizing.  The topic is inevitably 
central because ―administrative state‖ describes the government under 
which we live.  The topic is unavoidable for two reasons.  First, the 
combination of regulatory and enforcement authority in the same hands 
challenges Americans‘ civics-book understanding of the separation of 
powers.  Despite the constitutional vesting of legislative power in Congress, 
―the citizen confronting thousands of pages of regulations—promulgated by 
an agency directed by Congress to regulate, say, ‗in the public interest‘—
can perhaps be excused for thinking that it is the agency really doing the 
legislating.‖2  Second, in the face of Americans‘ oft-voiced aspiration for a 
government of laws, the bureaucracy appears to be awash in discretion.  
This discretion is arguably controlled only at the margins by a federal 
judiciary that sanctions the passing of policymaking authority to 
administrative agencies under a rarely enforced nondelegation doctrine.3  
For both reasons, the legitimacy of the administrative state is always a topic 
ripe for debate. 
To those anxious about the administrative state‘s legitimacy, the U.S. 
Supreme Court‘s now-iconic Chevron4 decision could well be troubling.  
Especially if read literally, its famous two-step framework for judicial 
review of agency legal interpretation affords administrative agencies 
considerable deference in imputing meaning to Congress‘s enactments.  
Federal courts are to defer to any ―permissible‖ interpretation of the law in 
 
*  Jacob E. Davis and Jacob E. Davis, II Chair in Law, The Ohio State University Moritz 
College of Law. 
 
 1. Adrian Vermeule, The Administrative State:  Law, Democracy, and Knowledge, in 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (Mark Tushnet et al. eds., 
forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=2329818. 
 2. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1879 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 3. LISA SCHULZ BRESSMAN, EDWARD L. RUBIN & KEVIN M. STACK, THE REGULATORY 
STATE 141–42 (2010) (―[T]he [Supreme] Court has suggested that no delegation is likely to 
fail muster on constitutional non-delegation grounds.‖). 
 4. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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question whenever a statute ―is silent or ambiguous with respect to the 
specific issue‖ presented.5  Chief Justice Roberts has recently voiced in 
dramatic terms the anxiety such deference provokes: 
 When it applies, Chevron is a powerful weapon in an agency‘s 
regulatory arsenal.  Congressional delegations to agencies are often 
ambiguous—expressing ―a mood rather than a message.‖6  By design or 
default, Congress often fails to speak to ―the precise question‖ before an 
agency.  In the absence of such an answer, an agency‘s interpretation has 
the full force and effect of law, unless it ―exceeds the bounds of the 
permissible.‖7 
 It would be a bit much to describe the result as ―the very definition of 
tyranny,‖ but the danger posed by the growing power of the 
administrative state cannot be dismissed.8 
The Chief Justice appears to see little difference between Chevron 
deference and the wholesale abdication of legal construction entirely to a 
single branch of government. 
I try, in this Essay, to evaluate this particular worry:  Should Chevron 
deference be thought inconsistent with legitimacy in the administrative 
state?9  In particular, I examine whether or under what conditions Chevron 
poses a threat to what is routinely taken to be an essential component of 
government legitimacy, namely, the rule of law.  This inquiry requires me 
first to set out a conception of the rule of law that is plausible for the 
administrative state—a state in which discretion abounds.  I argue that 
Chevron is consistent with the most normatively attractive such conception.  
I believe, however, that a proper conception of the rule of law also has 
implications for two important questions:  (1) whether there is room for 
political considerations in judicial review of the permissibility of agency 
action and (2) whether presidential involvement in an agency‘s decision 
making should intensify its entitlement to Chevron deference.  My answer 
to the first question is ―no‖ and to the second, ―almost always no.‖ 
I.   THE RULE OF LAW IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
Discussions of concepts like ―legitimacy‖ or ―the rule of law‖ are 
typically muddy because so many plausible conceptions exist of those 
ideas.  Jeremy Waldron has identified the rule of law as an ―essentially 
contested‖ concept, meaning that its internal complexity gives rise to 
plausible rival versions of the concept that prioritize its various features 
 
 5. Id. at 843. 
 6. City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1879 (citing Henry J. Friendly, The Federal 
Administrative Agencies:  The Need for Better Definition Standards, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1263, 
1311 (1962)). 
 7. Id. (citing Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 218 (2002)). 
 8. Id. (citing Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2266 (2011) 
(Scalia, J., concurring); Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1374 (2012)). 
 9. This Essay is part of a larger symposium entitled Chevron at 30:  Looking Back and 
Looking Forward.  For an overview of the symposium, see Peter M. Shane & Christopher J. 
Walker, Foreword:  Chevron at 30:  Looking Back and Looking Forward, 83 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 475 (2014). 
2014] CHEVRON, RULE OF LAW, AND PRESIDENTS 681 
very differently.10  Scholars writing about the administrative state 
sometimes use legitimacy to mean something like resemblance to the 
original constitutional design,11 and sometimes—as I do— to mean worthy, 
in principle, of both respect and public acceptance.12 
For the purposes of this discussion, I mean the rule of law to refer to 
government under a set of formal and informal processes that operate to 
promote the following normative propositions: 
1. That government action should be bounded by rules promulgated by 
institutions legitimately authorized to make rules that both authorize 
and constrain government behavior; 
2. That the governing rules and their implementation be respectful of 
human rights, including all individual rights entrenched in the law 
itself; 
3. That government actors should obey the law, that is, they should 
perform conscientiously those duties that the law mandates and 
refrain from acts that the law prohibits; 
4. That government actors, in exercising such discretion as the law may 
authorize, be able to justify their discretionary action according to 
reasons rooted in a sound interpretation of the relevant law; and 
5. That meaningful recourse should be available to citizens should they 
be injured by government action in violation of these requirements. 
My position is that a government so organized as to try to ensure these 
values provides its citizens the rule of law. 
Two aspects of the foregoing propositions are possibly controversial.  
First, I build legitimacy into the first of these propositions in order to couple 
the rule of law with a set of criteria that render law itself worthy of respect.  
Allen Buchanan has usefully written that ―an entity has political legitimacy 
if and only if it is morally justified in wielding political power.‖13  A full-
blown explication of his argument is unnecessary for this Essay, but I mean, 
at least, to endorse his notion that to morally ―exercise a monopoly, within a 
jurisdiction, in the making, application, and enforcement of laws,‖14 the 
relatively small subset of a polity that gets to wield state power must take as 
their governing premise equal consideration for the interests of all persons 
subject to the jurisdiction‘s laws.15  As Buchanan argues, it is difficult to 
see how a wholly undemocratic society could fulfill that premise.16  
Building a political legitimacy premise into a conception of the rule of law 
 
 10. Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)?, 
21 L. & PHIL. 137 (2002). 
 11. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction:  An Arbitrariness 
Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1675 n.92 (2004) (―By agency legitimacy, I mean 
consistency with the constitutional structure . . . .‖). 
 12. Cf. Emily Hammond & David L. Markell, Administrative Proxies for Judicial 
Review:  Building Legitimacy from the Inside-Out, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313 (2013). 
 13. Allen Buchanan, Political Legitimacy and Democracy, 112 ETHICS 689, 689 (2002). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. passim. 
 16. Id. at 717. 
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necessarily implies also that the rule of law, properly understood, requires 
some sort of democratic foundation. 
Second, I am insisting that the rule of law has implications not only for 
the observance of legal duties and prohibitions, but also for the justifiability 
of acts that the law entitles administrators to take within their discretion—
that is, within the zone of action that the relevant law neither mandates nor 
prohibits.  That may seem odd given that the very point of having discretion 
might well be thought to be freedom to decide by whatever standards one 
chooses.  Yet we would not have much of a rule of law in the administrative 
state if the reasons for even discretionary action did not have to be rooted in 
authorizing law.  The considerations animating the rule of law ideal—
especially the fear of arbitrary power and the equality of respect due the 
interests of all citizens—are no less important when administrators exercise 
their discretion than when they perform mandatory duties.  To generalize 
from what Steve Burton has written about the exercise of discretion by 
judges, rule of law values ―support a norm that requires [officials] at the 
least to justify their decisions in the rules, principles, and policies of the 
law.‖17 
I am strengthened in my conviction as to the soundness of this 
conception of the rule of law because so much of our administrative law 
system is implicitly structured around its elements.  They are all but 
codified in the Administrative Procedure Act‘s (APA) standards for judicial 
review of agency action,18 especially as implemented through federal 
courts‘ embrace of the ―hard look‖ doctrine.19  That is, courts are directed 
to ―compel agency action unlawfully withheld‖20 and to set aside agency 
action ―contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; in 
excess of statutory jurisdiction . . . without observance of procedure 
required by law.‖21  These standards pretty much cover my first three 
normative premises.  Courts are likewise to set aside agency action that is 
―arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 
 
 17. Steven J. Burton, Particularism, Discretion and the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF 
LAW 178, 186 (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994). 
 18. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
 19. Originally, the hard look doctrine required courts to ensure that the agency had 
taken a hard look at the regulatory issues.  Over time, however, the D.C. Circuit 
morphed the hard look doctrine ―into one that required a hard look not just by 
the agency, but by the court as well.‖  As now—D.C. Circuit Judge Garland 
recognized, the D.C. Circuit developed three iterations of its hard look doctrine:  
procedural, quasi-procedural, and substantive hard look.  Regardless of who 
was required to do the hard looking, in each of these three iterations, the D.C. 
Circuit‘s hard look doctrine gave courts much more authority to invalidate 
agency action than the rational basis review originally contemplated by the 
APA—and no variant of the hard look doctrine was linked to the doctrines for 
judicial review of congressional action. 
Scott A. Keller, Depoliticizing Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 84 WASH. L. REV. 
419, 438–39 (2009) (citing Nat‘l Lime Ass‘n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 451 n.126 (D.C. Cir. 
1980); see Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 
525–34 (1985)). 
 20. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). 
 21. Id. § 706(2)(B)–(D). 
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with law,‖22 a standard that—through the use of the word ―otherwise‖—
directly links discretion with acting in ―accordance with law.‖ 
Courts truly deferential to agencies might well render the ―arbitrary and 
capricious‖ standard only a very loose control over agency behavior.  As is 
well known, however, courts have done precisely the contrary.  As 
summarized in recent years by an ABA section task force, agency decisions 
may be set aside as arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion for a 
wide variety of reasons, including the absence of ―a reasonable relationship 
to statutory purposes or requirements.‖23  An agency defending its action 
must offer an explanation that links its initiative to statutory purposes based 
―upon reasoning that is [not] seriously flawed.‖24  These prongs of the 
jurisprudence of judicial review link the arbitrary and capricious standard to 
rule of law values and explicitly tie the legality of discretionary action to its 
justification according to legally authorized reasons. 
Thus conceived, the rule of law helps to bolster a series of values widely 
taken to be fundamental elements of political legitimacy.  Most obviously, 
the rule of law protects against arbitrariness in two senses.  From the 
perspective of society as a whole, the rule of law helps to ensure that those 
in power cannot do what they want just because they want to do it, or 
because they have force on their side.  From the point of view of individual 
persons, the protection of individual rights coupled with the requirement of 
ordinary legality works to ensure that no one‘s liberty is constrained 
without plausible justification. 
Because government officials may do only what the law permits, the rule 
of law also advances democratic legitimacy to the extent that the law is the 
product of democratic institutions.  Democracy provides an important 
justification for the requirement of law-based reasoning even as to 
discretionary action.  Not only does public reasoning facilitate judicial 
review of official action, it also enables Congress and the public generally 
to monitor legal compliance and legal efficacy, thus promoting further 
democratic deliberation over the exercise of government power.  The values 
of nonarbitrariness, democratic legitimacy, and institutional 
accountability25 together form the normative basis for the rule of law ideal 
in the administrative state. 
II.   CHEVRON AND THE RULE OF LAW 
It is easy to see, from a rule of law perspective, why the Chevron 
decision, at least in its rhetoric, could provoke anxiety.  In an essay 
ultimately approving of the decision, then-Judge Kenneth Starr wrote: 
 
 22. Id. § 706(2)(A). 
 23. Ronald M. Levin et al., A Blackletter Statement of Federal Administrative Law—
Preface, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 42 (2002). 
 24. Id. 
 25. For especially nuanced explorations of the idea of accountability and its relationship 
to democratic legitimacy, see generally Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the 
Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (2005), and Heidi Kitrosser, 
Accountability and Administrative Structure, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 607 (2007). 
684 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
Affording deference to an agency‘s legal analysis . . . seems facially 
contrary to the fundamental principle, incorporated in Chief Justice John 
Marshall‘s broad dictum in Marbury v. Madison, that ―it is emphatically 
the duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.‖  Judicial 
deference to agencies‘ statutory interpretations . . . necessarily means that 
an agency of the executive branch, to a greater or lesser degree, is 
displacing the judiciary in its traditional and jealously guarded law-
declaring function.26 
Coupled with the appearance of judicial displacement, Judge Starr 
continued, Chevron appeared to mark a relaxation in agency accountability 
to courts:  ―[T]he Court‘s decision rendered untenable an assumption that 
seems to have undergirded many administrative law decisions in the past:  
that federal courts have a general duty to supervise agencies in much the 
same way that the Supreme Court supervises lower federal courts.‖27 
Even in its first decade, however, commentators were hardly unanimous 
in joining Judge Starr‘s characterization of Chevron as ―revolutionary.‖  
Russell Weaver, for example, thought Chevron‘s institutional implications 
were easily overstated: 
[M]y sense is that Chevron‘s importance has been exaggerated.  Chevron 
did not profoundly alter either the Supreme Court‘s conduct, or that of the 
lower federal courts.  The Supreme Court frequently invokes Chevron, 
but it rarely defers without carefully scrutinizing agency interpretations.  
Moreover, the Court has been quite willing to reject agency 
interpretations, and the Court is often reluctant to ―defer‖ in the sense of 
accepting a reasonable agency interpretation when it prefers an alternative 
interpretation.  Thus, although Chevron‘s rhetoric differed from 
Skidmore‘s, the scope of review remains essentially unchanged.28 
As Professor Weaver recognized, the boldness of Chevron appears mostly 
in the rhetoric of its now-ubiquitous two-step framework, implying that 
agencies should be bound only where statutes are completely free of 
ambiguity on the ―precise question presented,‖ and requiring judicial 
acceptance whenever an agency proposes to resolve statutory ambiguity in a 
merely rational way. 
Putting aside that rhetoric, however, the conceptual basis for Chevron‘s 
general stance on judicial review would appear to flow ineluctably from the 
very structure of the nondelegation doctrine on which the administrative 
state is founded.  That doctrine rests on the proposition that a permissible 
vesting of decision making authority in the executive demands that 
Congress, in its authorizing legislation, include a meaningful boundary line 
that enables courts to differentiate lawful from unlawful administrative 
 
 26. Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 
283 (1986) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). 
 27. Id. at 284.  For a more anxious contemporary assessment of the implications of 
Chevron by another distinguished appellate judge, see generally Abner J. Mikva, How 
Should the Courts Treat Administrative Agencies? 36 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1986). 
 28. Russell L. Weaver, Some Realism About Chevron, 58 MO. L. REV. 129, 131–32 
(1993). 
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acts.29  The so-called ―intelligible principle‖ rule30 requires that every 
statute embody boundaries that are discernible by judges applying the 
traditional tools of statutory construction to measure the scope of 
Congress‘s delegation.  Judges using those tools may disagree as to a 
statute‘s most legally plausible reading, but some agency-constraining 
content must at least be detectable. 
At the same time, authorizing legislation is just that—an authorization, 
within some bounded realm of government power, for an agency to follow 
its best judgment in implementing the statute Congress has enacted.  The 
bifurcation of legally discernible constraint, on the one hand, and authorized 
discretion, on the other, does not itself dictate the intensity with which 
courts should review an agency‘s stance on either question.  It does imply, 
however, that the inquiries are different—that the agency must have a sense 
of its boundaries that it interprets correctly and an understanding of its 
discretion that it advances permissibly.31  Otherwise, there would be no 
difference between boundaries and discretion. 
Merely tracing the Chevron two-step to its delegation doctrine roots, 
however, might still leave two rule of law anxieties unanswered:  Can the 
rule of law be reconciled (1) with the nondelegation doctrine itself and 
(2) with ―deferential‖ review of agency interpretations of law where statutes 
are legally ambiguous? 
Two interrelated rule of law–based objections to the current state of 
nondelegation doctrine are common.  The first is that the breadth of 
delegation which courts now permit violates a supposed requirement that 
Congress make all substantive policy choices of sufficient weight to be 
regarded as legislative in nature.32  The second is that the so-called 
intelligible principles that courts attribute to statutes in order to sustain their 
constitutionality are utterly illusory.33  That is, broad delegations violate the 
rule of law because the statutory constraints on administrative authority are 
simply too vaporous to count as actual rules. 
So much ink has been spilled on the nondelegation doctrine that I will be 
brief in my own responses to these challenges.  To the first, it must be 
observed that no one has truly succeeded in articulating a judicially 
manageable standard for differentiating permissible from impermissible 
 
 29. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944) (―Only if we could say that there 
is an absence of standards for the guidance of the Administrator‘s action, so that it would be 
impossible in a proper proceeding to ascertain whether the will of Congress has been 
obeyed, would we be justified in overriding its choice of means for effecting its declared 
purpose of preventing inflation.‖). 
 30. J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (―[So long as 
Congress] shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or 
body authorized to [exercise the delegated authority] is directed to conform, such legislative 
action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.‖). 
 31. See generally Patrick M. Garry, Accommodating the Administrative State:  The 
Interrelationship Between the Chevron and Nondelegation Doctrines, 38 ARIZ. L.J. 921 
(2006). 
 32. See generally DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY:  HOW 
CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993). 
 33. 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.6 (5th ed. 2013). 
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delegations that is sounder in theory or in any way more plausible than 
current doctrine.34  The constitutional text itself provides no guidance.  If 
anything, the textual scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause35 implies 
that some version of the nondelegation doctrine more stringent than the 
―intelligible principle‖ requirement would run headlong into the Framers‘ 
intention that Congress have broad leeway in deciding how to implement its 
constitutional authorities through executive branch officers.36 
That the founding generation might not have had in mind the particular 
breadth of discretion that the executive branch enjoys does not belie the 
legitimacy of broad delegation.  As Jerry Mashaw has so thoroughly 
documented, the early decades of U.S. public administration were highly 
experimental and little constrained by any common understanding that the 
constitutionally prescribed separation of powers was procrustean in its 
rigidity.37  So long as Congress provides agencies a mission that represents 
a rational means for implementing the constitutional powers of the 
legislative branch, and so long as those missions are constrained by 
enactments susceptible to interpretation through ordinary tools of statutory 
construction, no violation of the Constitution has occurred. 
As to the ―law-ishness‖ of legislative constraints as broad as, say, ―the 
public interest, convenience, and necessity‖ standard for granting broadcast 
licenses,38 the fact is that courts, in appropriate cases, appear capable of 
deploying ordinary interpretive tools to read operationally meaningful 
constraints on administrative action into even broad authorizing statutes.  
Administrators and their lawyers actually treat even broadly worded statutes 
as constraining them.  In policing such laws, courts undoubtedly tolerate a 
degree of ambiguity that would be improper for a statute threatening 
individual liability for noncompliance.  But that is not the right standard for 
judging whether the delegation to an agency counts as ―law.‖  Agency 
officials who misapprehend the boundaries Congress has set to the 
 
 34. The most intellectually ambitious attempt in this regard is the work of Professor 
Schoenbrod, who has proposed that courts distinguish between statutes that permissibly 
enact rules requiring only interpretation in their implementation and statutes that 
impermissibly enact only goals that require executive branch implementation through 
making law or rules on its own. SCHOENBROD, supra note 32, at 181–85.  Even assuming this 
to be a manageable distinction—a heroic assumption—it is not clear that it maps 
persuasively onto either constitutional history or the normative purposes typically associated 
with the nondelegation doctrine. See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, Pro Delegation:  Why 
Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985); Eric A. 
Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721 
(2002). 
 35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 36. Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers 
Questions—A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 493 (1987).  For a narrower 
view of the clause, see generally Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope 
of Federal Power:  A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267 
(1993). 
 37. See generally JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION:  
THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2012). See also 
GERHARD CASPER, SEPARATING POWER:  ESSAYS ON THE FOUNDING PERIOD (1997). 
 38. 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (2012). 
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administrative programs for which they are responsible are not, on that 
account, held liable for civil or criminal wrong.39  They are subject only to 
―do-overs.‖40  Although various enactments might well be improved by 
being more or less specific, depending on the agency‘s assigned mission, 
statutory ambiguity does not defeat the operation of the rule of law as long 
as there is some ―there‖ there. 
Nor does the fact of judicial deference to an agency in interpreting its 
authorizing legislation threaten the rule of law.  The consistency of the 
judicial function with some institutional deference in legal interpretation is 
a very old idea.  Peter Strauss has cited Edwards’ Lessee v. Darby41 for the 
Supreme Court‘s early embrace of the proposition:  ―In the construction of 
a doubtful and ambiguous law, the contemporaneous construction of those 
who were called upon to act under the law, and were appointed to carry its 
provisions into effect, is entitled to very great respect.‖42  In a sense, 
however, the idea has even more venerable Supreme Court roots.  In his 
opinion for the Court eight years earlier in McCulloch v. Maryland,43 Chief 
Justice Marshall—whose Marbury opinion remains the Supreme Court‘s 
iconic claim of the judiciary‘s entitlement to ―say what the law is‖44—had 
this to say about the appropriateness of institutional deference in 
constitutional cases: 
[A] doubtful question, one on which human reason may pause, and the 
human judgment be suspended, in the decision of which the great 
principles of liberty are not concerned, but the respective powers of those 
who are equally the representatives of the people, are to be adjusted; if not 
put at rest by the practice of the Government, ought to receive a 
considerable impression from that practice.  An exposition of the 
constitution, deliberately established by legislative acts, on the faith of 
which an immense property has been advanced, ought not to be lightly 
disregarded.45 
―[R]eceiv[ing] a considerable impression from . . . practice‖ is a good 
definition of deference.  And compared to the deference to Congress that 
Chief Justice Marshall thought consistent with the appropriate judicial role 
in constitutional interpretation, deference to the executive branch in the 
―exposition‖ of statutes seems a very mild nod to interbranch comity.  Chief 
 
 39. There is, of course, no law criminalizing the misinterpretation of statutes in the 
course of implementation.  Moreover, ―government officials performing discretionary 
functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct 
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 
person would have known.‖ Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
 40. Christopher J. Walker, The Ordinary Remand Rule and the Judicial Toolbox for 
Agency Dialogue, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2242869. 
 41. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 206 (1827). 
 42. Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” 
and “Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1154 & n.43 (2012) (citing Edwards’ 
Lessee, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 210). 
 43. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 44. Marbury v. Madison, 5. U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1802). 
 45. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 401. 
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Justice Marshall plainly saw no logical inconsistency between judicial 
claims of power to say what the law is and judicial practices of accounting 
for other branches‘ views in that process. 
A rule of law challenge to Chevron would be stronger if the Step Two 
assessment of agency interpretations of law were toothless, but it is not.  It 
is now commonplace that courts review the reasonableness of agency legal 
interpretation under Step Two with the rigor associated with judicial review 
of rulemaking generally.46  To elicit deference, an agency must offer 
reasoned support for its interpretation, rooted in the purposes of the 
statute.47  To take but one highly publicized example, the D.C. Circuit 
accepted the FCC‘s position that it was entitled to regulate broadband 
providers only after the panel majority was persuaded that the FCC had 
reasonably taken into account the language of the relevant statutory 
provision, its legislative history, the agency‘s prior interpretations of its 
authority, and the potential impact on its authority of other relevant 
legislation.48  Although courts faced with statutory ambiguity are limited by 
Chevron to determining whether the agency has proffered a ―permissible 
construction of the statute‖ in question, the inquiry into permissibility can 
be searching. 
If this were not the case—if courts implementing Step Two were less 
rigorous—the risk to the rule of law would be evident in internal agency 
practice.  And, no doubt, the Supreme Court‘s emphatic reminder of the 
deference owed agencies had some impact in elevating the authority of 
nonlawyer agency policy makers and reducing the de facto veto power of 
agency general counsels.49  By itself, however, that sort of shift hardly 
betokens a descent into agency lawlessness.  As recent work by Professors 
Emily Hammond and David Markell suggests, agencies engaged even in 
administrative activity all but practically immune to judicial review may 
nonetheless conduct that activity in a manner that displays fidelity to law, 
fairness, and neutrality in decision making, transparency, and rationality.50  
An agency‘s professionalism and institutional culture, its networks of 
important relationships with stakeholders, the empowerment of intended 
 
 46. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass‘n v. State Farm Ins., Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983); 
Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 635 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (―The Chevron inquiry overlaps 
substantially with that required by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), pursuant to 
which we must also determine whether the Commission‘s actions were ‗arbitrary, capricious, 
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.‘ 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see 
National Ass‘n of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 
41 F.3d 721, 726–27 (D.C. Cir. 1994).‖). 
 47. Prior to ascending the bench and pretty much in the immediate wake of Chevron, 
Chief Judge Merrick B. Garland anticipated this approach. Merrick B. Garland, 
Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 550 (1985). 
 48. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 637–40. 
 49. E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters:  How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles 
of Congress, Courts and Agencies in Environmental Law, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 12 (2005) 
(―Chevron opened up and validated a policy making dialogue within agencies about what 
interpretation the agency should adopt for policy reasons, rather than what interpretation the 
agency must adopt for legal reasons . . . .  Chevron has increased the weight given to the 
views of air pollution experts in the air program office relative to the lawyers in OGC.‖). 
 50. Hammond & Markell, supra note 12. 
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regulatory beneficiaries through the petition process, and norms internalized 
from programs that fit the more conventional pattern of accountability to 
judicial review may all help generate agency lawfulness from within.51  If 
agency respect for law is notable with regard to programs where judicial 
review is all but precluded, it hardly seems that subjecting agency legal 
interpretation to the kind of deferential but careful review normally 
associated with rulemaking would act as a license for agency policymakers 
to ignore sound legal advice.  If anything, a deference regime requires 
government lawyers to be careful and precise in advising their agency 
clients, distinguishing between the legal boundaries of agency discretion 
and the kinds of factors that would make discretionary action within those 
boundaries nonarbitrary. 
Moreover, it bears emphasis that there is a deep way that deference to 
agency interpretation in the face of ambiguity positively advances the rule 
of law.  In their pathbreaking study of the work of congressional drafters, 
Abbe Gluck and Lisa Bressman found that the overwhelming majority of 
those surveyed—over 80 percent—were aware of the Chevron doctrine,52 
and ―91% reported that one reason for statutory ambiguity is a desire to 
delegate decision making to agencies.‖53  Although the drafters surveyed 
indicated that statutory ambiguity often resulted from motivations other 
than a purposeful determination to leave the resolution of issues to the 
agency, they were aware that statutory ambiguity effectively made the 
resolution of ambiguity an agency task.54  These findings suggest that the 
theory of congressional delegation on which Chevron largely rests—a 
theory frequently dismissed as a legal fiction55—actually mirrors legislative 
understanding and drafting practice faithfully.  That is, in reminding courts 
to defer to agencies in the resolution of ambiguity, Chevron is carrying out 
a conscious congressional design.  Whether enlarging agency authority is 
typically the motivating factor behind statutory ambiguity, it may well be so 
in particular cases, and, in any event, Congress is likely to be aware that 
enhanced delegated authority is the inevitable consequence of ambiguity.  
The delegation is thus intentional, even if not motivational. 
Chevron detractors may object that what Congress understands it is 
delegating to an agency through ambiguous statutory authorization is not 
room for agency judgment as to what the statute means, but only room for 
agency judgment as to how the statute is best implemented.  But the two 
issues are necessarily intertwined.  To be sure, whether an agency has 
reasonably interpreted its statutory mandate is analytically a different 
question from whether its exercise of discretion pursuant to that discretion 
is arbitrary and capricious; maintaining this distinction is important to the 
 
 51. Id. at 316–17. 
 52. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—
An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons:  Part I, 65 
STAN. L. REV. 901, 995 (2013). 
 53. Id. at 997. 
 54. Id. at 995–98. 
 55. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Reclaiming the Legal Fiction of Congressional Delegation, 
97 VA. L. REV. 2009, 2025–34 (2011) (reviewing the academic literature). 
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preservation of rule of law values, as discussed further below.56  But every 
application of agency authority is simultaneously an assertion that its 
statute, properly interpreted, authorizes that application within the scope of 
the agency‘s delegated policymaking discretion.  That reality is the 
foundation of the Court‘s recent opinion that there is no distinction between 
jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional agency assertions of statutory authority.  
As Justice Scalia wrote:  ―[T]here is no difference, insofar as the validity of 
agency action is concerned, between an agency‘s exceeding the scope of its 
authority . . . and its exceeding authorized application of authority that it 
unquestionably has.‖57 
It is precisely because of this kinship that any distinctive difference in the 
stringency with which courts police agency interpretations of legally 
ambiguous statutory boundaries and agency applications of the 
implementation authority they claim would be anomalous.  With regard to 
the very issue in Chevron—the permissibility of the EPA‘s ―bubble‖ 
approach to the definition of ―modified major stationary source‖58—the 
arguments that the EPA would make for the permissibility of its reading of 
the Clean Air Act‘s ambiguities would be all but identical to its arguments 
in defense of its proposed rule as an implementation strategy.  On both 
matters, the EPA would have to persuade a court that a definition of 
―modified major stationary source‖ that permitted ―bubbling‖ amounts to a 
sufficiently appropriate means of accomplishing Congress‘s purposes to be 
both within its discretion and rational.  As the casebook I coauthor notes:  
―Judicial deference at Chevron‘s ‗Step Two‘ appears to be deference to the 
same sorts of expert determinations and policy inferences to which courts 
are expected to defer under the ‗arbitrary or capricious‘ standard‖ when 
applied to the rule as a form of implementation.59  For this reason, judicial 
deference in the review of agency legal interpretation that is roughly 
equivalent to its deference in review of agency legal implementation is not 
only consistent with rule of law premises, but advances the value of judicial 
fidelity to honoring Congress‘s delegation of authority to the agency in the 
first place. 
III.   PRESIDENTIAL REGULATORY OVERSIGHT AND THE RULE OF LAW 
Given the link now traced between rule of law values and the respect 
Chevron commands for Congress‘s choice of administrative decision 
maker, then-Professor Elena Kagan‘s much-cited 2001 article championing 
presidential involvement in administration makes a surprising claim—
namely, that courts should intensify Chevron deference if presidential 
 
 56. See infra at p. 698. 
 57. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1870 (2013). 
 58. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
 59. JERRY L. MASHAW, RICHARD A. MERRILL, PETER M. SHANE, M. ELIZABETH MAGILL, 
MARIANO-FIORENTINO CUÉLLAR & NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:  THE 
AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 1009 (7th ed. 2014). 
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influence is apparent in the legal interpretation under review.60  This is 
surprising because of the seeming decoupling of Congress‘s explicit choice 
of administrative decision maker from the obligation of courts to defer.  The 
proposition is yet more unexpected in light of two other conclusions now-
Justice Kagan has proffered.  First, she is cautionary about the rule of law 
implications when Congress delegates administrative authority directly to 
the President,61 which might otherwise have seemed intuitively the most 
appealing circumstance for according Chevron deference to presidentially 
driven policymaking.  Further, she has argued that an agency should be 
thought to have waived its entitlement to Chevron deference if the 
congressionally named administrator, typically the agency head, sub-
delegates the relevant decision making authority to another official within 
his or her agency—a proposition that seems to emphasize the rule of law 
value in respecting Congress‘s initial assignment of decision making 
responsibility.62 
To be fair to Kagan‘s argument, it is not primarily a project to square 
Chevron with a theory of the rule of law.  The basis for a rule of law 
argument in support of intensifying—or at least preserving—Chevron 
deference if presidential influence is apparent in the legal interpretation 
under review would come from a ―unitary executive‖ interpretation of the 
Constitution, which Kagan does not embrace.  Under ―unitary executive‖ 
theory, the President is constitutionally entitled to direct the exercise of all 
discretion that Congress delegates to any administrative agency.  Deference 
to the President would thus be consistent with the rule of law because the 
Constitution itself would have effectively vested in the President all forms 
of policy discretion exercised by the executive branch.  Taken seriously, 
unitary executive theory means that Congress‘s assignment of decision 
making responsibilities is ultimately only hortatory.  Presidents could not 
 
 60. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2376 (2001) 
(―Chevron‘s primary rationale suggests [an] approach, which would link deference in some 
way to presidential involvement.‖). Jack Beermann not only insists that the questions are 
separate, but is deeply critical of the Roberts Court for not giving clearer guidance as to 
when to apply arbitrary and capricious review and when to apply what is properly Chevron 
Step Two review. Jack M. Beermann, Chevron at the Roberts Court:  Still Failing After All 
These Years, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 731, 743–48 (2014). But, as I argue, an agency‘s 
arguments for the permissibility of its interpretation are likely to track what would be its 
arguments for the reasonableness of its statutory implementation strategy. The relevance of 
one or the other standard is likely to turn chiefly on the way in which a plaintiff frames the 
legal challenge to the agency action at issue. Shane & Walker, supra note 9, at 483 n.53 
(―Whether a court uses one or the other rubric for its decision is most likely to turn on 
whether the challenge to agency reasonableness is based on an alleged lack of principled 
connection between agency action and the purposes and boundaries set in the relevant 
statute—which makes the dispute look interpretive—or whether the agency is assertedly 
lacking in its demonstration that the connections it posits actually exist on the record, which 
sounds more like an arbitrary and capricious challenge.‖). 
 61. Kagan, supra note 60, at 2368–69. 
 62. David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. 
REV. 201, 204 (―If the congressional delegatee of the relevant statutory grant of authority 
takes personal responsibility for the decision, then the agency should command obeisance, 
within the broad bounds of reasonableness, in resolving statutory ambiguity; if she does not, 
then the judiciary should render the ultimate interpretive decision.‖). 
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only themselves direct how statutorily designated decision makers are to 
exercise discretion, they could presumably require statutorily designated 
decision makers to implement decisions essentially made by other 
administrators.63 
Unitary executive theory, however, is largely indefensible as 
constitutional interpretation despite its earnest defenders‘ repeated claims 
on its behalf.64  It is indefensible as a historical reading because the 
founding generation regarded the discretion constitutionally vested in the 
President as pertaining to management, not policy.65  The debates in the 
first Congress regarding the structure of our first administrative departments 
indicate the contemporary view that the President need have policy control 
over only those administrators who assist in implementing the specific 
constitutional powers vested in the executive, not responsibilities assigned 
to the executive entirely by Congress.66  Unitary executive theory is also 
implicitly refuted by the constitutional text, which explicitly makes the 
President commander-in-chief of the military67 and authorizes him to seek 
written opinions on official matters from all heads of departments.68  If 
Article II‘s vesting of executive power had by itself created the unitary 
executive, both of these subsequent constitutional assignments would be 
superfluous.69  Indeed, the latter would seem bizarre. 
It also must be said that Congress does not embrace this theory.  Over 
sixty years ago, Congress enacted explicit authority for the President to 
delegate to any official appointed with Senate advice and consent ―any 
function which is vested in the President by law, or any function which 
such officer is required or authorized by law to perform only with or subject 
 
 63. Cf. Jason Marisam, The President’s Agency Selection Powers, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 
821, 853–54 (2013). 
 64. See PETER M. SHANE, MADISON‘S NIGHTMARE:  HOW EXECUTIVE POWER THREATENS 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 32–42 (2009). 
 65. See JOHN A. ROHR, TO RUN A CONSTITUTION:  THE LEGITIMACY OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 1–3 (1986). 
 66. See Peter M. Shane, Independent Policymaking and Presidential Power:  A 
Constitutional Analysis, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596, 615–17 & nn.73–78 (1989). 
 67. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, para. 1. 
 68. Id. 
 69. A 2002 Office of Legal Counsel opinion, since withdrawn on other grounds, actually 
opined that the President of the United States enjoyed and would enjoy plenary control over 
decision making regarding the disposition of prisoners of war whether or not the 
Constitution included the commander-in-chief clause:  ―[Our] constitutional structure 
requires that any ambiguity in the allocation of a power that is executive in nature must be 
resolved in favor of the executive branch . . . .  Even if the Constitution‘s entrustment of the 
Commander-in-Chief power to the President did not bestow upon him the authority to make 
unilateral determinations regarding the disposition of captured enemies, the President would 
nevertheless enjoy such a power by virtue of the broad sweep of the Vesting Clause.‖ 
Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att‘y Gen., for William J. Haynes, II Gen. 
Counsel, Dep‘t of Defense Re:  The President‘s Power as Commander in Chief to Transfer 
Captured Terrorists to the Control and Custody of Foreign Nations 4 (March 13, 2002), 
withdrawn by Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att‘y Gen., Memorandum for 
the Files Re:  Status of Certain OLC Opinions Issued in the Aftermath of the Terrorist 
Attacks of September 11, 2001, at 2 (Jan. 15, 2009). 
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to the approval, ratification, or other action of the President.‖70  Under 
unitary executive theory, this statute, too, would be utterly superfluous. 
Kagan‘s project, however, is not rooted in unitary executive 
constitutional interpretation.  It is intended instead to deploy Chevron to 
incentivize White House involvement in administrative decision making, 
which her article champions chiefly on grounds of administrative 
effectiveness and democratic accountability.71  She notes that the Chevron 
opinion justifies Step Two deference in part because the courts lack the 
democratic accountability of the elected branches, and then ascribes 
administrative agencies‘ democratic accountability substantially to their 
hierarchical relationship to the President: 
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political 
branch of the Government.  Courts must, in some cases, reconcile 
competing political interests, but not on the basis of the judges‘ personal 
policy preferences.  In contrast, an agency to which Congress has 
delegated policy making responsibilities may, within the limits of that 
delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration‘s views of 
wise policy to inform its judgments.  While agencies are not directly 
accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely 
appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such 
policy choices—resolving the competing interests which Congress itself 
either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by 
the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of 
everyday realities.72 
Following the logic of the Court‘s observations, Kagan notes, the strongest 
cases for Chevron deference would seem to be those in which ―presidential 
involvement [in agency legal interpretation] rises to a certain level of 
substantiality, as manifested in executive orders and directives, rulemaking 
records, and other objective indicia of decision making processes.‖73 
Kagan properly notes that Chevron‘s other explicit justifications—
congruence with congressional intent, agency expertise, and the rigors of 
agency deliberative process74—all cut against treating presidential 
involvement as a lever for intensifying judicial deference.75  Each, that is, 
recognizes the specific legitimacy of deferring to the particular 
administrator to whom Congress has assigned an administrative task.  And 
as it happens, these justifications, rather than the agencies‘ link to the 
President, have come to dominate judicial understanding of the rationale for 
Chevron deference.  What Kagan accurately observed as of 2001 is yet 
more emphatically true in 2014:  ―[T]he deference rule has become 
 
 70. 3 U.S.C. § 301 (2012). 
 71. Kagan, supra note 60, at 2331 (―All models of administration must address two core 
issues: how to make administration accountable to the public and how to make 
administration efficient or otherwise effective.‖). 
 72. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 
(1984). 
 73. Kagan, supra note 60, at 2377. 
 74. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. 
 75. Kagan, supra note 60, at 2373–74. 
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disconnected from considerations relating to presidential involvement . . . .  
[C]ourts . . . have ignored the President‘s role in administration action in 
defining the scope of the Chevron doctrine.‖76  United States v. Mead 
Corp.,77 the Court‘s most comprehensive subsequent statement delimiting 
the scope of Chevron deference, centers the inquiry entirely on the nature of 
congressional delegation.  The Court wrote that ―a reviewing court has no 
business rejecting [on policy grounds] an agency‘s exercise of its generally 
conferred authority to resolve a particular statutory ambiguity‖ when it is 
―apparent . . . that Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak 
with the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the statute or fills a 
space in the enacted law.‖78 
What Chevron‘s history thus suggests is that the Court frames its 
significance more in the rule of law terms I have discussed than in light of 
the virtues Kagan associates with ―presidential administration.‖  In other 
words, courts defer to specific agencies because Congress has chosen 
specific agencies to be the locus of policymaking.  This is, I believe, a good 
thing because I think Kagan rather overstates the virtues of ―presidential 
administration.‖  First, there is reason to doubt both the claims usually 
made for the presidency‘s democratic character, namely, that it represents 
national, as opposed to parochial interests, and that incentives pull 
presidents toward the policy preferences of the median voter.79  Indeed, 
assuming democracy is advanced when government aligns its policies with 
those of the median voter, Matthew Stephenson has provided strong 
theoretical support for the proposition that such an alignment is more likely 
to be accomplished by an administrative agency with some degree of 
independence from direct presidential control than by the President 
himself.80 
Moreover, institutional accountability is more likely to be achieved 
through the interaction of checking and balancing institutions than by 
imputing to the President a comprehensive discretion-directing power.  Key 
elements of accountability in our public law system include the following:  
(1) requirements of notice and public input prior to administrative 
rulemaking; (2) requirements of public statements of basis and purpose for 
agency rules that lay out an agency‘s legal authority and the policy 
rationales upon which it acts; (3) judicial review; and (4) public scrutiny of 
 
 76. Id. at 2373–75; see also Emily Hammond, Chevron‘s Generality Principles, 83 
FORDHAM L. REV. 655, 677 (2014) (―Chevron . . . is grounded in presidential accountability. 
. . . But it is interesting that the factor plays little to no role in the second-order Chevron 
decisions.  As a descriptive matter, this omission invites rethinking about the place of 
presidential control in administrative law doctrine.‖). 
 77. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 78. Id. at 229. 
 79. See generally B. DAN WOOD, THE MYTH OF PRESIDENTIAL REPRESENTATION (2009). 
 80. Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L. 
REV. 53, 55 (2008) (―Forcing the politically responsive president to share power with a 
partially insulated, politically unresponsive bureaucracy tends to reduce the variance in 
policy outcomes, because bureaucratic insulation creates a kind of compensatory inertia that 
mutes the significance of variation in the president‘s policy preferences.‖). 
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agency performance as facilitated by the Freedom of Information Act81 and 
a vigorous press. 
In light of these mechanisms, it remains truly uncertain what White 
House oversight contributes to regulatory effectiveness82 except in one 
class of cases:  The White House is uniquely positioned atop the executive 
branch to spot coordination problems among agencies.  I thus propose 
below that Chevron deference might sometimes be deployed with a 
welcoming eye to presidential involvement, but only when problems of 
coordination arise.83 
Kagan, in her academic role, was not oblivious to these concerns.  
Indeed, the precise reason she advocated (1) increased Chevron deference 
based on presidential influence over a subordinate‘s decision making rather 
than (2) increased Chevron deference to the President when Congress 
delegates administrative authority specifically to the President personally is 
that the President, unlike a subordinate member of the executive branch, is 
not subject to judicial review under the APA.84  Likewise, aware of the 
importance of transparency in legitimating administrative policymaking, 
she argues: 
[I]f presidential policy is to count as an affirmative reason to sustain 
administrative action . . . then the relevant actors should have to disclose 
publicly and in advance the contribution of this policy to the action—in 
the same way and for the same reasons that they must disclose the other 
bases for an administrative decision to receive judicial credit.85  
This limitation on Chevron deference would avoid one of the apparent 
difficulties that might flow from deferring to enhanced presidential 
involvement in administrative policymaking:  the availability of executive 
privilege to shield the President‘s input from public (or judicial) view. 
In truth, however, aside from the coordination problem I am bracketing 
for the moment, there is nothing the White House is likely to contribute to 
agency legal interpretation that would make that interpretation more 
deference-worthy from a rule of law point of view.  To see this most 
clearly, it is helpful to focus a bit on both the nature of deference and on the 
limited range of cases in which White House involvement in administrative 
action could even conceivably make a difference in Chevron‘s application.  
Chevron deference is critical, by definition, only in those cases where (a) a 
statute is legally ambiguous and (b) a court is persuaded of the policy 
wisdom of resolving that ambiguity in a manner different from the agency‘s 
proffered interpretation.86  That is, an agency does not need deference to 
 
 81. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012). 
 82. SHANE, supra note 64, at 158–67. 
 83. Cf. Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory 
State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260 (2006). 
 84. Kagan, supra note 60, at 2368–69. 
 85. Id. at 2382. 
 86. Peter M. Shane, Ambiguity and Policy Making:  A Cognitive Approach to 
Synthesizing Chevron and Mead, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 19, 24 (2005). 
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prevail in any case in which its legal interpretation, all told, strikes a court 
as the best interpretation possible. 
How could presidential involvement in agency interpretation affect this 
conventional understanding of Chevron?  This is easiest to analyze through 
a thought experiment—or series of thought experiments—captured in the 
figure on the next page.  Each scenario assumes that some form of 
agency/White House consultation resulted—with regard to a legally 
ambiguous statutory provision—in the formulation of an executive branch 
statutory interpretation which a reviewing court must now assess.  We can 
imagine then that a court‘s review of the relevant record could show either 
that the White House and the agency agreed on an executive branch 
interpretation or that White House involvement pressured the agency into 
abandoning a preferred legal interpretation.  In the latter case, the record 
might also reveal whether the agency‘s abandoned interpretation would 
itself have had sufficient support in the record to be upheld under Chevron 
Step Two.  For each of these scenarios, we can consider (1) how the court 
should respond if it finds the executive branch interpretation permissible 
under Chevron Step Two and (2) whether the simple fact of White House 
involvement ought to make any difference to the court‘s view. 
Two possibilities seem uncontroversial.  Should the White House and an 
agency agree on an interpretation that would be permissible even without 
taking account of White House involvement (Box 1 in the figure on the next 
page), of course, the court should defer.  There is no reason why a legal 
interpretation that is nonarbitrary based on legally relevant reasons should 
be subject to second-guessing because the agency-preferred interpretation 
matches that of the White House.  Likewise, if the executive branch 
interpretation is reasonable under Chevron Step Two, there would be no 
reason to abandon deference if it were disclosed that the agency had earlier 
revealed a preferred interpretation that, had it been offered, would have 
been deemed arbitrary on the record presented (Box 6).  It would not be the 
fact of White House involvement that merits deference, but rather that the 
agency exercised its own discretion in abandoning a weaker view for a 
stronger one. 
That really leaves two overall categories of cases in which a plausible 
question is raised about the relevance of White House involvement.  What 
should happen if it appears to the court that the executive branch 
interpretation lacks sufficient support under conventional Step Two analysis 
to warrant deference?  In other words, should the existence of a White 
House policy preference be sufficient to make an interpretation of law that 
otherwise would appear arbitrary deference-worthy (Boxes 2, 4, and 5)?  
Finally, perhaps most puzzling, what should happen if the executive branch 
interpretation would pass muster under Chevron Step Two, but the record 
reveals that the White House nudged the agency into abandoning another 
interpretation that would also have passed muster under Chevron Step Two 
(Box 3)? 
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Figure 1.  How presidential involvement in agency interpretation affects 
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presidency‖ were stronger, a presidential imprimatur for agency legal 
interpretation would ordinarily add no legal weight to an otherwise weak 
legal interpretation just because the President endorses it.  Although a 
number of scholars have recently offered sophisticated frameworks for 
accommodating some degree of political influence over administrative 
action within ―arbitrary and capricious‖ review, none has purported to apply 
the framework to Chevron Step Two deference.87  Presumably, that is 
because there is no rule of law value to be served by according that sort of 
treatment to the President‘s policy preferences, standing alone, as a basis 
for legal interpretation, as opposed (possibly) to implementation. 
Recall why an agency may earn Chevron deference.  As explained 
earlier, the Chevron framework and the nondelegation doctrine on which it 
is founded posit a distinction between discernible boundaries to permissible 
agency action and the justifiability of action taken within those boundaries.  
That is frequently not an easy line to draw.  The kinds of factors an agency 
is likely to find persuasive with regard to its most effective implementation 
of a statute are likely to show up also in the agency‘s brief as reasons 
corroborating that its challenged action falls within a proper interpretation 
of its statutory boundaries.  A court mindful of not overstepping its 
authority by second-guessing an agency‘s choice of implementation 
strategy will likely be respectful also of the agency‘s interpretation of an 
ambiguous legal boundary.  In claiming authoritativeness with regard to 
legal interpretation, the agency touts its expertise, the rigors of its 
deliberative processes, and, of course, Congress‘s explicit selection of the 
agency as its chosen instrument of administration. 
If, however, despite these factors, the agency‘s proffered legal 
interpretation still appears to a court to be arbitrary, the President‘s 
involvement in advancing what appears to be an unreasonable reading of 
the statute does not make it more reasonable.  Arbitrary is arbitrary.  
Deferring to the President in order to uphold what appears to be an arbitrary 
statutory reading runs counter to the goal of agency institutional 
accountability—agencies will learn that they can dodge legal accountability 
by signing on to (or perhaps inviting) White House–preferred views that 
will be given deference even if not persuasively reasoned.  Using 
presidential agreement (or inducement) as a proxy for democratic 
accountability will not work either.  A statutory interpretation that cannot 
 
 87. See, e.g., Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and 
Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 8 n.15 (2009) (―This Article focuses on arbitrary and 
capricious review and thus does not directly propose changes to other judicial review 
doctrines, such as Step Two of Chevron.  In this sense, this Article proceeds under the 
understanding that arbitrary and capricious review and Step Two of Chevron deference are 
distinct in what they require—meaning that Chevron ‗reasonableness,‘ which is used to test 
the fit of an agency‘s interpretation with a statute, does not equate to State Farm ‗reason 
giving,‘ which is used to assess the rationality of an agency‘s reasoning process.‖); see also 
Nat‘l Cable & Telecomms. Ass‘n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1001 n.4 (2005) 
(differentiating between Chevron Step Two and arbitrary and capricious analysis in noting 
that inconsistency in an agency‘s position ―bears on whether the Commission has given a 
reasoned explanation for its current position, not on whether its interpretation is consistent 
with the statute‖ under Chevron). 
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be adequately explained by justifications rooted in the statute may or may 
not coincide with the contemporaneous preferences of a majority of voters 
or even the preferences of a majority of the President‘s electoral supporters.  
It presumably cannot be squared, however, with the supporters of the 
Congress that enacted the statute in question—the implication of finding 
that the executive branch‘s legal interpretation cannot be reconciled on the 
record presented with the law actually enacted.  Ignoring the democratic 
process that generated a statute in favor of the merely presumed political 
preferences of a contemporary majority represents no overall gain in 
democratic legitimacy. 
The hardest question that could face a court is this—what to do if an 
executive branch interpretation appears worthy of Chevron deference, but 
the record reveals that the agency is proffering the executive branch 
interpretation only because of White House pressure to abandon an agency-
preferred interpretation that would actually itself have been worthy of 
Chevron deference.  In this very unlikely imaginary situation—unlikely 
because it is improbable that the usual process of discovery in litigation 
would uncover such a scenario—I would argue that, subject to one 
exception, a court should defer to the proffered executive branch 
interpretation only if the court judges that interpretation actually superior to 
the agency‘s abandoned interpretation.  For all the reasons given above why 
White House involvement should not be allowed to convert an otherwise 
arbitrary statutory interpretation into a deference-worthy interpretation, 
neither rule of law values, nor democratic values more generally, would 
support deferring to a White House–induced legal interpretation which, 
even if legally justifiable, is inferior to a sounder legal interpretation 
preferred by the administrative institution as Congress‘s preferred decision 
maker about the statute at issue.  A legal regime that would allow a 
plausible White House legal interpretation to trump a superior agency 
interpretation would arguably incentivize substandard lawyering by both 
the agency and the White House.  Agency lawyers would realize that 
having the best possible interpretive argument would not immunize them 
from White House pressure to change, and the White House would know 
that it would not need the best possible argument to take interpretive 
authority away from the agency. 
This view might be thought in tension with a well-known conclusion 
proffered by Judge Patricia Wald in her oft-cited and much discussed 1981 
opinion in Sierra Club v. Costle.88  Judge Wald‘s book-length opinion 
upheld against a series of both substantive and procedural challenges a set 
of regulations called ―new source performance standards‖ (NSPS) 
governing emissions controls by coal-burning power plants.89  The NSPS 
were challenged as both inadequate and too stringent by environmental and 
industry plaintiffs, respectively.90  Among the environmental plaintiffs‘ 
complaints was the fact that the EPA had failed to docket a White House 
 
 88. 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 89. 44 Fed. Reg. 33,580 (June 11, 1979). 
 90. Sierra Club, 657 F.2d at 312. 
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meeting occurring after the rulemaking comment period in which the White 
House might have encouraged the EPA to retain its existing 1.2 lbs/MBtu 
ceiling for total sulfur dioxide emissions, rather than lowering that ceiling, 
which the EPA had at least considered as an option.91  The court concluded 
that the failure to docket the meeting was not improper because the 
1.2 lbs/MBtu ceiling had adequate factual support in the administrative 
record, and the EPA had assured the court that the NSPS were not based on 
any information or data it received through the White House meeting.92  
Judge Wald took implicit note of the possibility that White House influence 
might have nudged the EPA to accept the 1.2 lbs/MBtu ceiling as opposed 
to some other option that might also have found adequate support in the 
record, but thought such an outcome unproblematic: 
Of course, it is always possible that undisclosed Presidential prodding 
may direct an outcome that is factually based on the record, but different 
from the outcome that would have obtained in the absence of Presidential 
involvement.  In such a case, it would be true that the political process did 
affect the outcome in a way the courts could not police.  But we do not 
believe that Congress intended that the courts convert informal 
rulemaking into a rarified technocratic process, unaffected by political 
considerations or the presence of Presidential power.93 
Judge Wald‘s point, however, does not substantially undercut my 
analysis of the Box 3 problem.  In indulging White House influence over 
the choice of one or another implementation strategy ―factually based on 
the record,‖ Judge Wald was not actually confronting a case of White 
House pressure regarding legal interpretation.  The environmental plaintiffs 
did challenge the EPA‘s interpretations of the Clean Air Act with regard to 
a couple of matters, but none was relevant to the choice of the overall 
ceiling on sulfur dioxide emissions.  When an agency is concededly acting 
within its statutory authority—that is, once the boundaries of permissible 
discretion have been identified—it may well advance democratic 
accountability to permit the White House to influence agency 
implementation strategy, so long as the resulting strategy is in fact 
defensible on the usual technocratic grounds.  When it comes to defining 
the agency‘s jurisdiction, however, we face the conundrum of democratic 
accountability noted earlier.  The White House has no greater democratic 
claim to define the scope of an agency‘s jurisdiction than did the Congress 
that originally enacted the law that the agency is now implementing.  
Should a court be cognizant that the agency had in mind a view of its 
authority that is different from the White House view, but also justifiable 
under Chevron Step Two, then democratic accountability would seem to 
call for special solicitousness toward the agency that a democratically-
elected Congress picked to be the primary decision maker regarding the 
statute in question. 
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 92. Id. at 407–08. 
 93. Id. at 408. 
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There is arguably one exception to this analysis that courts should 
recognize.  At least in a thought experiment, one can imagine a situation 
where the President is persuasive that, even if an agency‘s preferred view 
might have been superior or at least acceptable in isolation, the 
interpretation of the agency in question would make it difficult for another 
agency within the executive branch to fulfill its own mission under a sound 
interpretation of the second agency‘s authorizing legislation.  For example, 
one could imagine a hypothetical situation in which, say, the soundest 
reading of a Department of Interior statute regarding wilderness 
conservation might make it difficult for the Department of Agriculture to 
give its forest management statutes their soundest reading—or vice versa.  
In that situation, because of the President‘s unique coordinating capacity, he 
might be able to argue that a suboptimal statutory reading by one or the 
other agency, if otherwise at least rational, ought to receive Chevron 
deference even if the agency under review would have preferred to maintain 
its own, sounder understanding of its mission.  Deference to this rare sort of 
presidential preference could be more persuasively linked to a power of 
managerial coordination traceable to the vesting of executive power in the 
President and his constitutional responsibility to take care that all law be 
faithfully executed.  Deferring to the President in this rare instance would 
be consistent with the rule of law. 
CONCLUSION 
At least since Marbury v. Madison, the ―government of laws‖ ideal has 
served as a bright lodestar, guiding the development of American public 
law.  It is frequently argued, however, that our legal system vests 
administrative decision makers with so much policymaking authority that 
the rule of law cannot now be taken seriously as a description of our 
governing ethos.  This view is wrong.  It is possible to articulate a set of 
normative premises that are commonly identified with the rule of law and 
which serve the values that lie at the heart of a government of laws:  
nonarbitrariness, democratic legitimacy, and institutional accountability.  A 
government of laws is a government that embraces these premises through 
institutional practices reasonably calculated to realize the rule of law norms.  
Judging whether we do or do not experience the rule of law thus has to be 
determined as much by the nature of our legal practices as by the content of 
our legal rules. 
From a rule of law perspective, the kind of deference Chevron counsels 
in the face of legally ambiguous statutes need not be problematic.  Any 
system in which different branches enact legislation and execute the law 
will entail the vesting of discretion by the former in the latter.  So long as 
the executing branch is required to justify its interpretations of legally 
ambiguous enactments with reasons rooted in the enacted law, the rule of 
law is respected. 
In all but the rarest of cases, however, rule of law values imply that, 
under a sound reading of our Constitution, deference should or should not 
be accorded entirely on the basis of the legal interpretation proffered by the 
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administrative agency that is Congress‘s designated administrative decision 
maker, which is typically not the White House.  White House involvement 
in persuading an agency to adopt a nonarbitrary interpretation that the 
agency embraces and can defend based on reasons rooted in law obviously 
should not count against that interpretation.  But White House involvement 
should not be thought to earn deference for a proffered legal interpretation, 
whether originally preferred by an agency or not, that otherwise appears 
unjustified under hard look review.  If the White House steers the agency 
away from an earlier preferred, but less sound interpretation of law, then the 
negotiated view, if non-arbitrary, should be given deference.  In such a 
scenario, it would be the merit of the interpretation that warrants deference, 
not the fact of White House influence. 
That leaves as the most theoretically interesting possibility, a scenario 
that may never surface in practice.  We can imagine an administrative 
record revealing that the White House has steered an agency away from an 
earlier preferred interpretation that would have been deference-worthy and 
at least as sound (in the eyes of a court) as the White House view now being 
offered as the agency‘s own.  In that extraordinary case, I argue that the 
court should ordinarily remand for further consideration by the agency.  In a 
government of laws, the President should not be able to trump a superior 
legal interpretation with his own unless his preference is rooted in a well-
grounded legal responsibility of the presidency.  One such case exists.  If 
the President‘s interpretation would enable other agencies to execute their 
legal missions more effectively, then Chevron deference linked to the 
presidential coordinating function could be linked persuasively to 
Article II‘s Vesting Clause and the founding generation‘s design of an 
executive that gave the President unique managerial responsibility.  But the 
Constitution should otherwise not be interpreted to allow the President to 
dictate the ways Congress‘s designated administrative decision makers 
exercise their discretion, especially with regard to the interpretation of law. 
